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The Evolution of Cooperation: Robustness to 
Mistakes and Mutation
Debora Di Gioacchino*
Trinity College, Cambridge (UK) 
and
European University Institute, Florence (Italy).
Abstract:It is well known that repeated games present an embarassing 
multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes. Recently, Binmore and Samuelson (1992) 
have shown that cooperation is the unique evolutionary stable outcome when 
a game is played repeatedly by finite automata. This paper considers whether 
the evolution of cooperation is robust. Two types of perturbations are 
considered: mistakes by agents and mutation in strategies. Mistakes by agents 
are described assuming that the game is played by noisy automata. Mutation 
in strategies is accounted for by formalizing evolution as a ’modified’ 
replicator dynamics which ensures that, at any point in time, every automaton 
is adopted by a positive number of players. Computer simulations indicate that, 
in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, cooperation is robust unless mistakes or 
mutation are very large.
*1 would like to thank David Canning, Alan Kirman and Iacopo Tassi for their 




























































































It is well known that repeated games present an embarassing multiplicity 
of equilibrium outcomes '. This multiplicity is due to the variety of rules that 
can be adopted by the agents to play the game. One way of dealing with this 
multiplicity is to analyze the process of rules adoption trying to reduce the set 
of possible rules and thus the set of equilibrium outcomes. Here it is assumed 
that the adoption of rules is governed by evolution.
Evolutionary game theory is characterised by random matching of 
players whose actions are genetically dictated; changes in behaviour occur at 
the population level due to the higher reproductive rates of successful 
phenotypes. Utility is replaced by Darwinian fitness, measured by the number 
of offsprings, and a strategy is to be interpreted as a (genetically) programmed 
mode of behaviour 2.
When applying evolutionary game theory in economics one has to 
confront the fact that human behaviour is more sophisticated than animals’ 
behaviour. Thus, while biologists assume that animals follow fixed strategy 
rules, economic agents are better described as finite automata whose behaviour 
is dictated by a set of procedures 3.
As it is explained at length in the next section, a finite automaton 
(Moore machine) is essentially a behavioral rule that tells the player how to 
behave in a repeated game 4. The use of finite automata to describe players’ 
behaviour allows to capture those aspects of bounded rationality that relates to 
the limits in the agents’ processing capacities. In this framework, in fact, the 
complexity of a behavioral rule can be measured by the number of states of the 
corresponding automaton.
Recently, Binmore and Samuelson (1992) have shown that if players use
‘A version of the so-called "Folk Theorem" holds for infinitely repeated 
games with and without discounting and for finitely repeated games with 
incomplete information. The theorem shows that, any norm of behaviour which 
guarantees to the players a payoff greater then their security level can be 
sustained as an equilibrium if those who deviate from the norm can be punished 
(see Fudenberg-Maskin, 1986).
2See, for example, Friedman (1991).
3Altematively, and equivalently, one can think of agents as using finite 
automata in their decisional processes. In what follows we refer to this second 
interpretation.
4The idea that players in a (repeated) game can be thought of as automata 




























































































finite automata to play an infinitely repeated game, then cooperation is the 
unique evolutionary stable outcome. This paper studies the robustness of their 
result to mistakes by agents and to mutation in strategies.
Following Binmore-Samuelson, an automaton selection game is 
considered in which evolution selects the fittest automata 5. They discuss 
evolutionary stability in terms of ’modified’ evolutionary stable strategy. This 
notion of equilibrium modifies Maynard-Smith’s (1982) definition of 
evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) to accomplish for lexicographic preferences 
of the ’metaplayers’ (as Binmore and Samuelson call the players in the 
automaton selection game) and for the possibility of survival of mutants whose 
observed behaviour is the same as that of the population. Moreover, while ESS 
may not exist a ’modified’ ESS always exists. They show that only cooperative 
automata can be part of a ’modified’ ESS.
In this paper evolution is discussed within a selection-mutation model. 
At birth, individuals are randomly matched to play a repeated game. Each 
player uses a finite automaton of given complexity to play the game on his 
behalf. We allow for mistakes by agents assuming that automata are noisy. At 
each stage of the repeated game the automaton "suggests" to the player the 
action to be taken. With high probability this is consistent with the behavioural 
rule represented by the automaton. However, with a small probability the 
automaton makes a mistake and "suggests" an action at random. If the 
population of players is large and if the game is repeated long enough, then the 
randomness due to players’ mistakes averages out.
Biologist formalize the genetic mechanism of natural selection using the 
replicator dynamics 6. We modify this dynamics to account for a continuous 
flow of mutations which ensures that, at any point in time, every automaton is 
adopted by a positive number of players.
In the next section a model is presented that allows to discuss the 
evolution of behaviour in 2x2 symmetric (repeated) games played by two-state 
noisy automata. In this case, the payoff matrix of the automaton selection game 
is easily obtained by computing the payoffs for each automaton against each 
other. However, even in this simple case, the solution to the modified replicator 
dynamics is extremely difficult. Therefore, we have simulated it for the case 
in which the basic game is the prisoner’s dilemma.
The results of the simulations show that cooperation is robust unless 
mistakes or mutations are very large. They also show that, if the probability of
5The automaton selection game has been defined and first analyzed by 





























































































mistakes is small, evolution selects for an automaton that cooperates if and 
only if both players took the same action in the previous period.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: the model is presented in 
the next section; in section 2 the prisoner’s dilemma is explicitly considered 
and in section 3 the results of the simulation are presented. Section 4 
concludes.
1 The model
Consider a large population of individuals. At any given time a 
"generation" is alive. Each generation lives for N "years" (N large) and then 
dies. At birth individuals are randomly paired to play a 2x2 symmetric matrix 
game N times (once each year); so that a large number of games are played 
each year. It is assumed that players use finite automata to decide what to do 
in a given situation.
A finite automaton for player i consists of a finite set of states S', an 
initial state s‘0, a reply function r' and a transition function T1. The reply 
function tells the player what action to take as a function of the current state: 
a'^r^s',), s‘t e S'. In what follows we assume that the reply function is such that 
a',=s‘, Vi. The transition function gives the state of the automaton at time t+1 
as a function of the state at t and of the action taken by the other player: 
sit+i=Ti(sit,ajl).
For any pair of automata {S^s'o^T1} and {Sj,sj0,ri,Tj} define:
(i) the state of the system at time t: s,=(s't,sjt)eS=S'xSj;
(ii) a transition function T on S such that a transition from one state to the 
other according to T is possible only if it is possible for both T' and Tj:
s,+i=Tst
A fixed point (steady state) for the system is a state s* such that s*=Ts*. 
Given T the steady state of the system is completely determined by the initial 
condition s0. This is so because the transition dynamics is deterministic.
If we allow for the possibility that sometimes automata make mistakes 
in the transition from one state to another7 then the steady state of the system 
is independent from the initial conditions. Let p be the probability that an 
automaton makes a mistake, then the probability of going from s', to 
s\+1=Ti(sit,ajt) is p(s‘t,s't+1)=l-p+p/k, where k=card(S'), and the probability of 
going from s', to anyone of the other k-1 states in S' is p(s'„s’'l+1)=p/k for any
7Note that since a'^s1, Vi, assuming that automata make mistakes in the 






























































































Analogously for the j-th automaton:
P(sjt,sjt+1)=l-p+p/k sjt+l=Tj(sj„ajt) 
p(sjl,s’Jl+I)=p/k V s’Jl+1eSJ, s’Jt+1*sJl+1
If automata make mistakes, then the transition process st+1=Tpst is an 
ergodic Markov chain 9 and has a unique equilibrium distribution which is also 
the unique stationary distribution (Cox-Miller, 1965). In appendix 3 we show 
how to use the transition function T to calculate the average payoffs in the 
repeated prisoner’s dilemma played by noisy automata of complexity two.
In what follows we assume that there is a fixed, exogenously given, 
upper bound on the complexity of the automata used by the players. Let A(k) 
be the set of all automata of complexity k and let n be the cardinality of this 
set.
Let U(ik,jk) be the average "lifetime" payoff (i.e. the average payoff in 
N years) for an individual using automaton ikeA(k) when playing against an 
individual using automaton jkeA (k). Note that average lifetime payoffs depend 
on the number of repetition. However, as N approaches infinity the weight of 
a single year’s payoff becomes negligible and U(ik,jk) becomes arbitrarily close 
to the payoff of the infinitely repeated game, U”(ik,jk), computed as limit-of- 
the-means. In what follows U(ik,jk) will be approximated by U"(ik,jk). 
Moreover, in the case of noisy automata, if the number of interactions between 
ik and jk, in any given generation, is sufficiently large, then the randomness due 
to players’ mistakes averages out. It follows that in a large population in which 
generation’s life is long enough, the matrix of average lifetime payoffs, 
U<k)={U(ik,jk)}, is the same in each generation and is approximately equal to 
i r (k).
The payoff matrix U(k) and the strategy space A(k) define an automaton 
selection game. It is assumed that the selection is operated by evolutionary 
forces. To find a dynamic equilibrium of the automaton selection game a state 
variable and a dynamic process must be defined. Let the state of the system be 
given by the distribution of automata in the current generation. Define
8Note that we have assumed that the next state after a mistake is randomly 
determined according to a probability distribution that puts equal weight on each 
point in S1.





























































































x(t)={X|(t), i=l..n, Dixi(t)= l} to be this distribution in the th generation 10; x(t) 
changes due to two forces: natural selection and mutations. We describe this 
intergenerational change using a ’modified’ replicator dynamics. According to 
this dynamics the majority of the population adjust their behaviour in response 
to current payoffs and move towards the most successful automata but a small 
proportion (h) of the population change their behaviour randomly.
Following the biological literature, we describe natural selection using 
the replicator dynamics according to which the growth rate of an automaton 
relative frequency is proportional to the difference between the average payoff 
for that automaton and the average payoff in the population. Formally the 
replicator dynamics can be expressed as (the dependence of x on time has been 
omitted to allow an easier reading):
( RD) x i = [ ( Ux) t -xUx ] x • 
where (Ux); = £ , U(i,j)Xj.
Recurrent mutations, although very rare, continuously increase the 
entropy of the system; even if selection pressure at a given time acts against 
the survival of the i-th automaton, this will be maintained by mutations and 
thus kept available for changed circumstances. The role of this second term is 
to keep automata from extinction by rewarding automata with small shares and 
penalising those with high shares. We describe this second component by a 
mutation equation in which Gy is the mutation rate from the j-th automaton to 
the i-th with Xi9ij= 1 Vj. The probability of mutation from j to i in the whole 
population is 0 ^ .  Thus the growth rate of the i-th automaton due to mutations 
is
(A0 
X i = £ (  O i j i j - t j , * , ) (2)
i '1
Assume 0„=O and 0jj=0kj=0 Vi,j,k, then J0=l/(n-l) (this follows from £¡0—1). 
Substituting in the above expression gives 11
10In what follows we omit the indication about the complexity of the 
automata and use i and j instead of ik and jk.




























































































- x , (3)y (M> = *• i
1 - x  ,
n -1
The ’modified’ replicator dynamics can thus be expressed by the 
following system of differential equations 12:
(.MRD)
l -x ,
Xi = (1 -h)[(Ux)r xUx]Xi + h{— j - x ) i=l..n 0<.hzl
As h tends to 1 mutations increase their influence upon the system and when 
h=l the only equilibrium of the system is Xj=l/n Vi.
A distribution x* is a Nash equilibrium of the automaton selection game 
if x*Ux*>yUx* VyeS„ 13. In particular this is true for y=ei=(00..1..00) so that 
x’Ux’>(Ux*)i. A Nash equilibrium x* is evolutionary stable (ESS) if for any 
other state yeS„:
(i) x*Ux* > yUx* 
or
(ii) x’Ux* = yUx' and x*Uy > yUy
Nash equilibrium and ESS are static solution concepts.
A dynamic equilibrium for the ’modified’ replicator dynamics is a fixed 
point of (MRD). A dynamic equilibrium x* is (locally) stable if for any 
neighbourhood I of x* there exists a neighbourhood I’ such that any trajectory 
originated in I’ remains in I, that is Vx(0)e I’ x(t)—>x’el. A dynamic 
equilibrium x* is asymptotically (locally) stable if any trajectory that originates 
in I converges to it, that is if there exists an open neighbourhood I(x”) such 
that if x(0)el then x(t)~>x*. Note that asymptotical stability is a more stringent 
condition than stability.
In general the ’modified’ replicator dynamics will have multiple 
equilibria. However, our simulations indicate that in some cases the system
12Hofbauer-Sigmund (1988, p.250) consider a selection-mutation dynamics 
which is a particular case of MRD where the two components (selection and 
mutation) have the same weight.
With mij=huij and e—hSy MRD and Hofbauer-Sigmund’s equation (25.4) are 
formaly the same. However, we have Eieij=h and not 1 as in their model. This 
makes clear that we are considering a case in which mutations are rare and 
therefore their impact on evolution is that of a perturbation on a selection 
process.




























































































may be globally stable. Looking at the simulations’ results (see section 3) it 
seems that global stability is easier to obtain when h>0 and p is small. Local 
stability has been observed in all simulations but one; as it is shown in figure 
1, in fact, the ’modified’ replicator dynamics need not converge but can exhibit 
a cyclical behaviour. These results suggest that the ’modified’ replicator 
dynamics can exhibit global convergence, local stability or cyclical behaviour 
depending on the initial conditions and on the value of h.
Some properties of the modified replicator dynamics are given in 
appendix 1.
2. The prisoner’s dilemma
In this section we apply the model of the previous section to investigate 
the evolution of behaviour in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma (see figure 
below, where C means Cooperate and D defect) played by two-state automata.
C D
c 2 2 -1 3
D 3 -1 0 0
The Prisoner’s Dilemma
A complete list of two-state automata able to play the prisoner’s 
dilemma is given in appendix 2 14.
The first automaton is the one that "always defect". Number 9 represent 
the GRIM-strategy: "start by cooperating and play cooperatively unless the 
other deviates, in this case defect in all subsequent periods". The 10th 
automaton says: "do what the other did in the previous period", this is TIT- 
FOR-TAT. Automaton number 11 is TAT-FOR-TIT which suggests: "repeat
14There are 16 (32 considering the initial condition) rules of complexity two 
able to play a 2x2x game. Binmore-Samuelson (1992) consider only 26 
automata because, without mistakes, the observed behaviour of the three 
automata that start cooperating and reply cooperatively to any choice of the 
opponent (automata 13, 14, 15) is indistinguishable from the behaviour of the 
automaton that always cooperate (automaton 16). Also the observed behaviour 
of the three automata that start defecting and defect after any choice of the 
opponent (automata 21, 25, 29) is indistinguishable from the behaviour of the 




























































































your previous action if the outcome was satisfactory otherwise change action". 
"Always cooperate" is the last automaton, the 16th.
Following the procedure illustarted in appendix 3 we have computed the 
payoff matrix U<2) for different probabilities of mistake. These are shown in 
tables 1 to 6 for p=0, .01, .05, .1, .2, .4 respectively 1S. The matrices in tables 
2 to 5 are 16x16 because two noisy automata with different initial state but 
otherwise identical are payoff-equivalent. Thus when automata make mistakes 
the generic element Uy of the payoff matrix U<2) is:
Uij=Ujj+|6=Ui+16j=Ui+]SB 6 i,j= l.. 16
that is, the 32x32 matrix is formed by four 16x16 identical submatrices and 
only one of them need to be considered in the automaton selection game. The 
steps needed to compute the payoff matrix U(2) for the prisoner’s dilemma are 
illustrated in appendix 3.
3. The results
We have simulated the ’modified’ replicator dynamics for the automaton 
selection games of tables 1-6 for a variety of initial conditions. Tables 7 to 12 
summarise the results. The first column in each table gives the distribution of 
automata in the population at time t=0. V, means that the initial distribution is 
Xi(0)=l-0.01(n-l) and Xj(0)=0.01 Vj^i. E means that the initial distribution is 
Xj(0)=l/n Vi. The second column gives the steady state of the ’modified’ 
replicator dynamics with h=.01 obtained from each initial distribution in the 
first column. The third column gives the corresponding steady state for the 
replicator dynamics, that is for the model without mutations.
When automata do not make mistakes the ’modified’ replicator dynamics 
with h=.01 converges to x9=.54, xIO=.10, xn=.12, x12=.08, x13=x14=x15=xl6=.04 
for all the initial distributions considered.
A comparison of the results obtained for h=.01 with those obtained for 
h=0 (see table 7) suggests that the role of mutations is to help in reaching a 
unique stable equilibrium. Note that table 7 is consistent with Binmore- 
Samuelson’s result according to which in two-player infinitely repeated games 
evolution leads to the survival of cooperative behaviour. In fact, all the 
automata that survive natural selection in the game of table 1 get, in 
equilibrium, a payoff of 2.
Table 8 summarises the convergence results obtained when p=.01, that 
is for the game of table 2. In this game there are three Nash equilibria in pure 
strategies, x,=l, x9=l and xn=l, but only the last one is an ESS. If there are 
no mutations (h=0) then the system converges to the ESS (x,,=l) or to a Nash
l5The payoffs in tables 1-6 are approximated to the first decimal place, 



























































































equilibrium (x9=l) depending on the initial distribution. Adding mutations 
(h=.01) the ’modified’ replicator dynamics converges to a dynamic equilibrium 
"close" to the ESS for all the initial distributions considered.
Looking at the payoff matrix in table 2 one can see that the 1 -st and the 
9-th automata are best replies against the 3-rd and the 5-th; therefore starting 
from V3 or V5 both x, and x9 grow. Since the 11-th automaton gets a negative 
payoff against the 1-st, in the system without mutations xn quickly becomes 
extinct. Figure 2 and 2b show that starting from V5 and without mutations the 
11-th automaton is quickly eliminated; both x, and x9 increase until x,=x9=.5 
and then, while x9 slowly grows, xt decreases l6. On the contrary, if h>0 then 
the 11-th automaton is never eliminated and once the environment becomes 
more favourable (which is when x; i>12 start growing) xn increases (see figure 
3).
Table 9 summarises the convergence results obtained when p=.05, that 
is for the game of table 3. In this game there are three Nash equilibria in pure 
strategies, x,=l, x9=l and xu=l; which are also ESSs 17. The results for this 
game are very similar to those in table 8. The replicator dynamics always 
converges to an ESS; to which one depends on the initial conditions. The 
’modified’ replicator dynamics with h=.01 converges to a dynamic equilibrium 
(xn=.98) "close" to the ESS with higher payoff for all the initial distributions 
considered.
Figure 4 and 5 show the evolution of the system starting from VI for 
h=.01 and h=0 respectively. In figure 4 mutations, by preventing automata 
from becoming extinct, allow the 10-th automaton to grow thus creating a 
favourable environment (high proportions of the i-th automaton, i>12) in which 
the 11-th automaton can prosper. This is unlike the system without mutations 
in which X]=l is locally asymptotically stable (see figure 5).
Table 10 summarises the convergence results obtained when p=.l, that 
is for the game of table 4. In this game there are three ESSs in pure strategies, 
x,=l, x9=l and x,,=l. The replicator dynamics always converges to an ESS; to 
which one depends on the initial conditions. Adding mutations (h=.01) the 
system converges to a dynamic equilibrium (xu=.98) "close" to the best ESS 
for all the initial distributions considered except V6 and V9; starting from V6 
and V9 the system converges to x9=.85, xu=.04. However, if h=.001 and the 
system starts from V6 or V9 it converges to xM=l.
l6This is because U(1,1)=U(1,9)=U(9,1)=.01 and U(9,9)=.015.
17For this and the following games, to say if a Nash equilibrium is an ESS 





























































































Table 11 summarises the convergence results obtained when p=.2, that 
is for the game of table 5. Also in this game x,=l, x9=l and xu=l are ESSs. 
The replicator dynamics converges to the best ESS if the system starts nearby 
(and also from E) and to x,=l or x9=l otherwise. In this game the dynamic 
equilibrium of the ’modified’ replicator dynamics with h=.01 is not "close" to 
the best ESS. In fact, starting from all the initial distributions considered, 
except for V I1, the steady state of the dynamics with h=.01 is x9=.88, xIO=.03, 
x,=.01, Xj=.01 i=l 1..16 (starting from V ll the steady state is x,,=.96).
Table 12 summarises the convergence results obtained when p=.4, that 
is for the game of table 6. In this game there are only two Nash equilibria in 
pure strategies (x,=l and x9=l), both of which are ESSs. The replicator 
dynamics converges to x,=l for all the initial conditions considered, except V6 
and V9, while starting from V6 or V9 the steady state reached is x9=l. The 
’modified’ replicator dynamics with h=.01 converges to x,=.94 starting from 
all the initial distributions considered, except V6, V9 and V10, and to x9=.90 
starting from V6, V9 or V10. In this game the steady state reached by the 
’modified’ replicator dynamics and by the replicator dynamics are "close" for 
all initial distributions except V10. This may be due to the fact that in a highly 
random environment mutations do not matter much.
4. Conclusions
From the simulation results illustrated in the previous section we can 
conclude that:
(i) In the unperturbed system (no mistakes nor mutations) the only survivors 
are GRIM and TIT-FOR-TAT l8. This is consistent with Binmore- 
Samuelson’s result. However, the dynamic equilibrium of the unperturbed 
system is not unique and it depends on the initial distribution of automata.
(ii) Introducing mutations into the selection dynamics (but mantaining the 
assumption of no mistakes) reduces this multiplicity and a unique equilibrium 
is selected in which a high share of the population is of the GRIM-type (with 
some TIT-FOR-TAT and some TAT-FOR-TIT).
(iii) In the model with noisy automata cooperation survives unless the 
probability of mistakes is very high. For p< 1 the population is almost entirely 
composed of TAT-FOR-TIT; when p=.2 GRIM is the fittest; for p=.4 
ALWAYS-DEFECT is the unique survivior. This is consistent with Fudenberg 
and Maskin (1990) who show that in 2x2 symmetric repeated games played by 
noisy machines, if mistakes are rare then evolutionary stability implies 
cooperation. If the probability of mistakes is too high then their assumption of





























































































lexicographic preferences is not satisfied and the efficient outcome is not 
guaranteed.
Compared with Axelrod’s (1984) tournament, our simulations indicate 
that in a noisy environemnt TIT-FOR-TAT never survives. The reason for the 
non-robustness of TIT-FOR-TAT is that occasional mistakes between two TIT- 
FOR-TAT automata trigger a sequence of mutual punishment. On the contrary, 
an occasional deviation from cooperation between two TAT-FOR-TIT automata 
causes a round of mutual defection followed by a return to cooperation.
If mistakes are interpreted as experimentation undertaken to identify the 
opponent, then the success of TAT-FOR-TIT can be seen as the result of its 
ability to use a costless signal (a ’secret handshake’ in Robson (1990) 
terminology) to recognise and to be recognised by other automata of the same 
type ,9.
19In the case of TAT-FOR-TIT the signal would be T(DD)=C, that is after 





























































































Here are some properties of the ’modified’ replicator dynamics:
PI: All dynamic equilibria of the ’modified’ replicator dynamics are in the 
interior o f the simplex.
proof: suppose not and suppose that in a dynamic equilibrium x*j=0 for some 
i; then
contradicting the hypothesis that x* is a dynamic equilibrium.
P2: In general, a dynamic equilibrium o f the ’modified’ replicator dynamics 
is not a Nash equilibrium.
proof: if x* is a dynamic equilibrium of the ’modified’ replicator dynamics then
1 -N x '
(1) (1 -h)xf[(Ux')r x 'U x ^ h — — f-  Vt
that is
(2) {Ux ")-x 'Ux'= h 1 ~Nxf 
l ~h x ’(N-l )
Vi
Suppose that x* is a Nash equilibrium then, by definition, x*Ux*>(Ux*)i Vi. This 
implies that x ^ l /N  Vi which contradicts X,x,=l.
P3: Let x be a dynamic equilibrium o f the ’modified’ replicator dynamics, then 
{Ux ")>x *Ux * if  x">—
and
{Ux*).<x'Ux' if x '< —
' J N
proof: the proposition follows from equation (2) of P2.
From the same equation also follows that




























































































0<(Ux)<xUx+—  Vi 
1 -h
to the Nash equilibrium.
For the replicator dynamics the following can be proven (see van 
Damme, 1991):
P4: I fx  is a symmetric Nash equilibrium o f U then x is a dynamic equilibrium, 
but the converse need not be true.
P5: I fx  is a stable dynamic equilibrium then x is a symmetric Nash equilibrium 
of U, but the converse need not be true.





























































































The entry ij in the following matrix is the state of the i-th automaton at 
t+1 if its state at t and the opponent action at t are as in column j (see section 
1). Remember that automata from 17 to 32 are equivalent to, respectively 
automata 1 to 16 except for the initial state (the first 16 automata start with C 
the last with D).
CC CD DC DD
1 D D D D
2 D D C D
3 D D D C
4 D D C C
5 D C D D
6 D C C D
7 D C D C
8 D C C C
9 C D D D
10 C D C D
11 C D D C
12 C D C C
13 C C D D
14 C C C D
15 C C D C





























































































For any pair of two-state automata able to play the prisoner’s dilemma 
there are four possible states of the system: s,=CC, s2=CD, s3=DC, s4=DD, 
where FA (r,A=C,D) indicates that the current state (action) of the automaton 
used by the first player is T and the current state (action) of the automaton 
used by the second player is A.
Let xa=prob(sa), a=1..4 and x=(x,,x2,x3,x4) and let 9ap=prob(sa-> sp) with 
£p9ap=l ct=l-4 (starting from any state the system has to go somewhere); qa(3 
depends on the automata used by the players as well as on the probability that 
automata make mistakes: qap=qap(i2j 2»P)- Consider the following system of 
linear equations:
Mx=b
where b=(0,0,0,0,l) and M is given by:
Q n - 1 921 f h i 941
9 l2 q 22- l 931 941
9 l3 923 q 33- l 943
9 )4 q 24 9 3 4 9 4 4 " !
1 1 1 1
The last equation (£axa=l) indicates that, at any time the system must 
be in one of the four states) 20. The solution of the system, x', is the unique 
stationary probability distribution over the states.
The payoff for a player using automaton i2 against j2 in the prisoner’s 
dilemma played by automata that make mistakes with probability p is: 
U(i2j 2,p)=2x*, - x*2 + 3x*3 21
where x’a=x’a(i2,j2,p)
As an example we solve the system for the case in which player 1 uses 
the 9-th automaton and player 2 uses the 10-th automaton (see appendix 1). If 
p is the probability that an automaton makes a mistake then the probability of
20This condition implies that in Mx=b one equation is linearly dependent 
from the others and can therefore be eliminated leaving us with a system of four 
equations in four unknowns (the Xj).
21Since the game is symmetric the payoff for a player adopting 
j2 against i2 is:





























































































a correct action is qc=(l-p)+p/2 and that of an incorrect action is pc= 1 -qc 22.
To calculate qaf!=qap(i2>j2>P) ct,¡3=1..4 we can use the diagrams in figures 
6a to 6d. In figures 6a and 6b the transition functions respectively for the 9-th 
and 10-th automaton are shown graphically. In figure 6c the transition function 
T obtained from T9 and T10 is shown. This is obtained by keeping only the 
arrows that are common to both T9 and T10. T describes the evolution of the 
system without mistakes. As it can be seen from figure 6c, if the system starts 
in CC then it stays there forever; but if it starts from any other state then it 
converges to DD. Figure 6d shows the transition function Tp corresponding to 
T in figure 6c. If automata make mistakes then all the transition from any state 
to any other occur with positive probability. The bold-line arrows correspond 
to the arrows in figure 6c i.e. to the case in which neither automata make 
mistakes and they represent a probability qap=qc2. The solid-line arrows 
correspond to the case in which only one automaton makes a mistake and 
represent a probability qap=qcpc. The dotted-line arrows indicate transitions that 
occur when both automata make a mistake; they represent a probability qap=pc2. 
It follows that the matrix M is given by:
q c2- i p cq c Pc2 Pc2
p cqc Pc2-1 Pc9c PcQc
p cq c q  c2 Pcqc- 1 PcQc
Pc2 Pc9c q c2 q / - 1
i i i l





. <7c +P c
22This is because we have assumed that when making a mistake the action 
taken is randomly drawn from a probability distribution that puts equal weight 





























































































For example, if p=.l, which implies qc=.95 and pc
and the payoffs are
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Table 2 probability of mistake p=.01
0.0 0.0 1.5 1.5 1.0 1.5 3.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.0 3.0 3.0
0.0 0.5 0.7 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 1.7 0.0 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.2 2.0 2.5 2.5
- 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.2 2.9 1.7 2.0 - 0.5 0.7 1.7 1.7 1.2 3.0 3.0 3.0
- 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 - 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 - 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.5 2.5 2.5
- 0.3 0.0 1.0 1.5 0.5 1.0 2.9 3.0 - 0.3 0.0 1.0 1.5 1.3 2.0 3.0 3.0
- 0.5 0.0 - 0.9 1.0 - 0.3 0.0 1.0 1.7 - 0.6 1.0 - 0.9 1.3 1.0 2.0 1.8 2.5
- 1.0 0.3 0.3 1.0 - 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.7 - 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
- 1.0 0.3 0.0 1.0 - 1.0 0.3 0.3 1.0 - 1.0 1.3 - 0.9 1.3 0.8 2.5 1.8 2.5
0.0 0.0 1.5 1.5 1.0 2.0 2.9 3.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 1.6 1.3 2.0 2.6 2.7
0.0 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.3 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
- 0.5 0.7 0.3 1.0 0.2 2.9 1.0 2.9 0.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 2.6 2.3 2.5
- 0.5 1.0 0.3 1.0 - 0.5 1.3 0.3 1.3 0.0 1.3 2.0 1.5 0.8 2.0 2.0 2.0
- 0.5 0.3 0.3 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.7 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.5
- 0.7 0.4 - 1.0 0.5 - 0.6 0.4 - 0.9 0.5 0.0 2.0 0.0 2.0 0.7 2.0 1.0 2.0
- 1.0 0.5 - 1.0 0.5 - 1.0 1.0 - 0.9 1.0 0.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 0.7 2.3 1.5 2.3
- 1.0 0.5 - 1.0 0.5 - 1.0 0.5 - 1.0 0.5 0.0 2.0 0.5 2.0 0.5 2.0 1.0 2.0
Table 3 probability of mistake p=.05
0.1 0.1 1.5 1.5 1.0 1.5 2.8 2.8 0.1 0.1 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.0 2.9 2.9
0.0 0.5 0.7 1.0 0.1 0.2 1.6 1.6 0.0 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.9 2.4 2.4
- 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.3 2.7 1.6 1.9 - 0.4 0.7 1.6 1.6 1.2 2.8 2.9 2.9
- 0.4 0.9 0.9 1.0 - 0.4 1.0 1.0 1.1 - 0.4 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 2.4 2.4 2.4
- 0.3 0.1 1.0 1.5 0.5 1.0 2.7 2.8 - 0.2 0.2 1.0 1.5 1.3 2.0 2.9 2.9
- 0.4 0.1 - 0.7 1.0 - 0.2 0.1 1.0 1.6 - 0.5 1.0 - 0.7 1.3 1.0 1.9 1.8 2.4
- 0.9 0.4 0.4 1.0 - 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.6 - 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.6 1.0 2.8 2.8 2.9
- 0.9 0.4 0.1 1.0 - 0.9 0.4 0.4 1.0 - 0.8 1.3 - 0.7 1.3 0.8 2.4 1.7 2.4
0.0 0.1 1.4 1.5 1.0 1.9 2.7 2.8 0.1 0.2 1.6 1.6 1.3 2.0 2.6 2.6
0.0 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.1 1.0 1.0 1.3 0.1 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.9 1.9 2.0
- 0.4 0.7 0.4 1.0 0.2 2.7 1.0 2.7 0.1 1.0 1.9 1.9 1.0 2.5 2.2 2.4
- 0.4 1.0 0.4 1.0 - 0.4 1.3 0.4 1.3 0.1 1.3 1.8 1.5 0.8 2.0 1.9 2.0
- 0.4 0.3 0.3 1.0 0.1 1.0 1.0 1.7 0.1 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.0 1.9 1.9 2.4
- 0.6 0.4 - 0.8 0.5 - 0.6 0.4 - 0.7 0.6 0.1 1.8 0.1 1.9 0.7 1.9 1.0 2.0
- 0.9 0.5 - 0.8 0.5 - 0.9 1.0 - 0.7 1.0 0.0 1.8 1.0 1.9 0.7 2.2 1.5 2.3
- 0.9 0.5 - 0.8 0.5 - 0.9 0.5 - 0.8 0.5 0.0 1.9 0.5 1.9 0.5 1.9 1.0 2.0
Table 4 probability of mistake p=.l
0.1 0.2 1.4 1.4 1.0 1.5 2.7 2.7 0.1 0.2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.9 2.8 2.8
0.1 0.5 0.7 1.0 0.2 0.4 1.6 1.6 0.1 0.7 0.7 1.1 1.2 1.9 2.3 2.4
- 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.3 2.4 1.6 1.9 - 0.3 0.7 1.6 1.6 1.2 2.6 2.7 2.8
- 0.3 0.9 0.9 1.0 - 0.3 1.0 1.0 1.1 - 0.3 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 2.3 2.3 2.3
- 0.2 0.2 1.0 1.4 0.6 1.0 2.5 2.7 - 0.1 0.3 1.0 1.5 1.3 1.9 2.7 2.8
- 0.3 0.2 - 0.4 1.0 - 0.1 0.3 1.0 1.6 - 0.4 1.0 - 0.5 1.3 1.0 1.9 1.7 2.4
- 0.8 0.4 0.4 1.0 - 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.6 - 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.6 1.0 2.6 2.6 2.8
- 0.8 0.4 0.1 1.0 - 0.7 0.4 0.4 1.0 - 0.6 1.3 - 0.4 1.3 0.8 2.3 1.7 2.3
0.1 0.2 1.4 1.4 1.0 1.8 2.5 2.6 0.1 0.3 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.9 2.5 2.5
0.1 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.1 1.0 1.0 1.3 0.1 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.9 1.9 1.9
- 0.3 0.7 0.4 1.0 0.3 2.5 1.0 2.4 0.1 1.0 1.7 1.8 1.0 2.4 2.1 2.3
- 0.4 0.9 0.4 1.0 - 0.3 1.3 0.4 1.3 0.1 1.3 1.6 1.5 0.8 1.9 1.8 1.9
- 0.4 0.3 0.3 1.0 0.1 1.0 1.0 1.7 0.1 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.0 1.9 1.9 2.3
- 0.5 0.4 - 0.6 0.6 - 0.5 0.5 - 0.5 0.6 0.1 1.7 0.2 1.8 0.7 1.9 1.0 1.9
- 0.8 0.5 - 0.7 0.6 - 0.7 1.0 - 0.5 1.0 0.1 1.7 1.0 1.8 0.7 2.1 1.5 2.2




























































































Table 5 probability of mistake p=.2
0.2 0.4 1.3 1.4 1.0 1.4 2.4 2.4 0.2 0.4 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.8 2.6 2.6
0.1 0.6 0.8 1.1 0.3 0.6 1.5 1.6 0.2 0.8 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.8 2.1 2.2
- 0.2 0.7 0.9 1.1 0.4 1.9 1.5 1.8 - 0.0 0.8 1.4 1.5 1.2 2.3 2.5 2.5
- 0.2 0.8 0.8 1.0 - 0.1 1.0 1.0 1.2 - 0.1 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.0 2.1 2.1 2.2
- 0.1 0.3 0.9 1.4 0.6 1.1 2.1 2.4 0.0 0.5 1.1 1.5 1.3 1.8 2.4 2.6
- 0.2 0.4 - 0.1 1.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 - 0.1 1.0 - 0.0 1.3 1.0 1.8 1.7 2.2
- 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.0 - 0.3 1.0 1.0 1.5 - 0.3 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.0 2.3 2.3 2.5
- 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.9 - 0.5 0.6 0.5 1.1 - 0.3 1.2 0.1 1.3 0.8 2.0 1.6 2.2
0.2 0.4 1.2 1.4 0.9 1.6 2.1 2.3 0.3 0.5 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.8 2.3 2.3
0.1 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.3 1.0 1.0 1.3 0.3 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.7 1.7 1.9
- 0.2 0.7 0.5 1.0 0.3 2.0 1.0 2.1 0.2 1.0 1.5 1.6 1.0 2.1 2.0 2.2
- 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.9 - 0.1 1.2 0.5 1.2 0.2 1.2 1.4 1.4 0.8 1.8 1.7 1.9
- 0.2 0.4 0.4 1.0 0.2 1.0 1.0 1.6 0.2 1.0 1.0 1.6 1.0 1.8 1.8 2.2
- 0.3 0.5 - 0.3 0.6 - 0.3 0.6 - 0.1 0.8 0.2 1.5 0.4 1.6 0.7 1.7 1.1 1.8
- 0.6 0.5 - 0.4 0.6 - 0.4 0.9 - 0.1 1.1 0.2 1.5 0.9 1.7 0.7 2.0 1.4 2.1
- 0.6 0.5 - 0.4 0.6 - 0.6 0.6 - 0.4 0.7 0.2 1.6 0.6 1.6 0.6 1.8 1.0 1.8
Table 6 probability of mistake p=.4
0.4 0.7 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.3 1.8 1.9 0.5 0.8 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.6 2.1 2.2
0.3 0.7 0.8 1.1 0.6 0.9 1.3 1.5 0.4 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.6 1.8 1.9
0.1 0.7 0.9 1.1 0.6 1.4 1.3 1.6 0.3 0.9 1.3 1.4 1.1 1.8 2.0 2.1
0.1 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.3 1.0 1.0 1.3 0.3 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.7 1.7 1.9
0.2 0.6 0.9 1.2 0.7 1.1 1.6 1.8 0.4 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.2
0.1 0.6 0.4 1.0 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.4 0.3 1.0 0.6 1.3 1.0 1.6 1.5 1.9
- 0.1 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.2 1.0 1.0 1.4 0.2 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.0 1.8 1.8 2.1
- 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.0 0.7 0.7 1.1 0.2 1.1 0.6 1.3 0.9 1.7 1.4 1.9
0.4 0.7 1.1 1.2 0.9 1.4 1.6 1.8 0.5 0.8 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.6 1.9 2.0
0.3 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.3 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.7
0.1 0.7 0.6 1.0 0.5 1.4 1.0 1.6 0.4 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.0 1.7 1.6 1.9
0.1 0.8 0.5 0.9 0.2 1.0 0.7 1.2 0.4 1.1 1.1 1.3 0.9 1.6 1.4 1.7
0.1 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.4 1.0 1.0 1.4 0.4 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.0 1.6 1.6 1.9
- 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.7 0.4 0.9 0.4 1.2 0.6 1.3 0.8 1.5 1.1 1.6
- 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.8 0.0 0.9 0.4 1.1 0.4 1.2 0.9 1.4 0.8 1.6 1.3 1.8




























































































Table 7 probability of mistake p=0
x„ h=0
E x„.=59 x,„=.19 x , 12 x„=.08 x;=.01 i= l 3. .  16
VI X(,=.42 xln=.58
V2 x„ . =  10 x,„=.36 x,,=.21 x,,=.33
V3 x,=.97 X|n=.03
V4 x?=.85 x,„=.09 x,,=.03 xP=.03
V5 x„=.72 x,„=.28
V6 x^=.74 x,„=.08 x , 14 Xp=.03
V7 x„=.93 x,„=.05 x,,=.01 x , o=.01
V8 x„=.77 x,„=.07 x , . 14 xp=.02
V9 x„=.92 xr .01 i= 10..16
V10 x„=.03 x,„-.93 x,,=.02 x,,=.01
V ll xf=.02 Xp=.01 x,,=.95 x„=.01
V12 x,,=.03 x, a=.02 x,,=.01 x,,=.94
V13 x„=.75 x,„=.24 x,,=.01 x , o=.01
V14 x„=.75 x,„=.24 x,,=.01 x,,=.01
V15 x„=.75 x,„=.24 x,,=.01 x,^=.01
V16 x„=.75 x,„=.24 x,,=.01 x,^=.01
V17 x„=.48 x,„=.52
V18 x0=.12 x,„=.35 x,,=.21 x,,=.32
V19 x„=.98 x , n=.02
V20 x^=.85 Xp=.09 x,,=.03 x,,=.03
V21 x„=.48 x,„=.52
V22 x„=.62 Xp=.06 x,,=.26 x,.,=.05
V23 x„=.95 x,„=.04
V24 x„=.72 x,„=.07 x , , = .  18 x,,=.02
V25 xP=.48 x,„=.52
V26 xq=.57 x,„=.27 x,,=.07 x,,=.08
V27 x,,=.02 x„=.95  X:=.01 i= 12.  28.  31
V28 Xo„=.93 x^=.03 xi=.02 i=l 1,31
V29 x„=.48 x , „ = .  52
V30 x^=,70 x,„=.08 x,,=.15 x,,=.05
V31 x„=,88 x,„=.07 x,,=.03 x,^=.02




























































































Table 8 probability of mistake p=.01
*0 h = .0 1 h = 0
E x,,=l
V I x„=-96 x,,=l
V 2 x„=-96 x„=l
V 3 x„=.96 xg=l
V4 x„=.96 xl,=l
V 5 x,,=.96 x, =  l
V 6 xn=.96 x,,=l
V 7 x„=.96 x„=l
V 8 x,,=.96 X11=  1
V 9 x„=.96 x„=l
V 1 0 x„=.96 x„=l
V ll x„=.96 x„=l
V 1 2 x,,=.96 x„=l
V 1 3 xu=.96 x„=l
V 1 4 x , ,= -9 6 x„=l
V 1 5 xn=.96 x„=l









































































































V ll xn=.98 xn=l
V12 x,,=.98 x„=l
V13 x„=.98 x,,=l
V14 kO OO X11 = 1
V15 xn=.98 xu=l



























































































Table 10 probability of mistakes p=.l
*0 h=.01 h-0
E x,,=.98 x,,=l
VI _>< 1 VO 00 x,=l




V6 x,=.85 x,,=.04 * x9=l
V7 x„=.98 x9=l
V8 x,,=.98 x9=l
V9 x9=.85 xn=.04 * Xg=  1
V10 >< 1 VO oo x,=l
VII _>< 1 VO oo x„=l




V16 2< VO OO x9 =  1




























































































Table 11 probability of mistakes p=.2
*0 h-.Ol h=0
E x9=.88 xio=.03 Xj=.01 i=l 1 ..16 x,=.01 x„“ l
VI x9=.88 x,0=.03 x—.Ol i—11.. 16 x,=.01 x,=l
V2 x9=.88 x10=.03 x—.Ol i= 11.. 16 x,=.01 x9=l
V3 x9=.88 x10=.03 x—.Ol i= 11.. 16 x,=.01 xs=l
V4 x9=.88 x10=.O3 x—.Ol i=l 1.. 16 X|>=.01 x9=l
V5 x9=.88 x10=.03 x—.Ol i= 11.. 16 x,=.01 x9=l
V6 x9=.88 x10=.O3 x—.Ol i—11..16 x,-.01 x9=l
V7 x9=.88 x10=.03 x—.Ol i=l 1.. 16 x,=.01 x9=l
V8 x9=.88 x10=.03 x—.Ol i—11 ..16 x,=.01 x9=l
V9 x9=.88 x10=.O3 Xi=.01 i—11 ..16 x,—.01 x9=l
V10 x9=.88 x10=.03 Xj=.01 i=l 1..16 x,=.01 Xi-1
Vll xn=.96 x„=l
V12 x9=.88 xio=.03 x—.Ol i—11 ..16 x,=.01 x9=l
V13 x9=.88 x10=.03 Xj=.01 i=l 1.. 16 x,=.01 x9=l
V14 x9=.88 x10-.03 x—.Ol i=11..16 x,=.01 x9=l
V15 x9=.88 x10=.03 Xj=.01 i=11..16 Xj=.01 x9=l




























































































Table 12 probability of mistakes p=.4
* 0 h = . 0 1 h = 0
E x,=.94 x ,- l
VI x,=.94 x,=l
V2 X [ = . 9 4 x,=l
V3 x,=.94 x,=l
V4 X II vO 4*. x,=l
V5 x,=.94 x ,- l
V6 x,=.90 x9=l
V7 xr .94 x,=l
V8 x,=.94 x , =  l
V9 x,=.90 x9=l
V10 X VO O x,=l
V ll x,=.94 x ,-l
V12 x,=.94 * 1 - 1
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